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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF CONTRACTS
PAUL F. GOLDSMITH
A. B. University of Denver, 1941; L.L. B. University of Denver, 1943;
Private practice, Denver, 1945-48; Member of firm of Sears and Gold-
smith, Denver, since 1948.
1. DEALINGS UNDERST6OD NOT To IMPOSE DUTY To MAKE
COMPENSATION
The case of Heafer v. Gathers' involves the claim of an auto-
mobile repair man for rental of a substitute car loaned to a custom-
er while the customer's car was being repaired. The customer con-
tends the lending was understood not to involve any duty to pay
rental. The Supreme Court ordered a new trial on this question.
The confusion arises over a "counter slip" which was to have been
submitted to the insurance company to evidence rental expense
but ended up, slightly altered, as a bill to defendant. (This case
could have been discussed under the heading of Interpretation be-
low.)
2. OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE INCLUDING:
(a) Promise for an act.
McCullough v. Thompson2
(See 4 (a), below)
(b) Lapse of offer in:
1. Option to purchase Real Estate.
In the case of Miller v. Hiett3 there was apparently a month to
month rent agreement with an option to buy the subject real estate
and apply rental to the purchase price. After paying $100.00 per
month rent for six and one-half years, the tenant sues for specific
performance and loses. The best reason, though not clearly ad-
vanced in the report, to support the result of the case is that the
offer to sell, in the option, had lapsed and the tenants never, prior
to suit, accepted the offer or exercised the option. It is not sufficient
to state, as was done in this case, that (1) there was no considera-
tion for the option, and (2) that there was a lack of mutuality. The
monthly payments themselves could be consideration, and mutual-
ity is not necessary.
2. Offer to pay broker a commission on sale of real estate





(See 4 (a), below)
(c) Lapse of counter-offer.
In the case of Lincoln Liberty Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez,6 Mar..
tinez' application for insurance was rejected by the defendant com-
pany. The company offered a policy with the premium "rated high
up." Martinez was injured in an automobile accident and died be-
1300 P.2d 523 (Colo. 1956).
:133 Colo. 352, 295 P.2d 221 (1956).
8 133 Colo. 576, 298 P.2d 394 (1956).
133 Colo. 382, 295 P.2d 1036 (1956).
5299 P.2d 120 (Colo. 1956).
8299 P.2d 507 (Colo. 1956).
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fore accepting the counter-offered policy and without having paid
the premium. The application provided: "That there shall be no
contract of insurance until a policy shall have been delivered to
me and the premium paid to the home office of said Company in
Lincoln, Nebraska, during my life time and in good health."7 On
the above showing judgment for plaintiff was reversed.
(d) QUERY: Is offer and acceptance necessary?
Kugel v. Young.8 This case is included here only to pinpoint the
court's statement in ruling on the petition for re-hearing. The case
arose on the question of automatic termination of a producers 88
oil and gas lease, "unless" specified delay rental payments were
made by a given date. The assignees of a part of the lease tendered
the second year delay rental on an incorrectly described part of the
total acreage and the lessors accepted and applied this tendered
rental without knowing the area covered by the assignment and
without intent to accept rental payment on less than the whole
tract. The court held that this constituted a continuance of the
lease as to the described portion and a surrender regarding the
omitted portion. On petition for re-hearing the problem of a
meeting of the minds, i. e., offer and acceptance of the "insuffi-
cient" delay rental was raised. The court stated that:
"where we have under consideration an already existing con-
tract partially performed, and under the facts and circum-
stances peculiarly applicable to this case, we cannot escape
the conclusion that the picture revealed, if not technically an
offer and acceptance, is so closely in the nature thereof that
the result is the same."9
3. INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS
In Williams v. Lundquist,0 the plaintiff sued for fifty per cent
of the profits from operation of a kitchen, operated in connection
with a bar. The plaintiff contended, and the court found, that only
cost of food and kitchen-help salaries were to be deducted from the
gross sales receipts from food. This was shown by parol evidence.
The case was reversed because the trial court did not deduct the
value of "house meals" for kitchen-help as part of, and an addi-
tional, expense of "kitchen salaries."
Note: the kitchen was operated'at a $3,400 loss if all operating
expenses are considered. Moral: Define kitchen expenses to include
a fair share of all overhead.
In United Oil Production Co. v. Quinn," Quinn's investment
was a pre-organization investment used by the president of United
to secure other investors. However, the company in which Quinn
expected to receive a one per cent share was never formed. In-
stead, United took over the project of the contemplated company
and Quinn was told her money was consumed by pre-organization
costs. The court gave Quinn a one per cent share in the project as
carried out by United, since in equity her money had been diverted
to United when United took over the contemplated project which
Id. at 508.
s 132 Colo. 529, 291 P.2d 695 (1955)
'Id. at 547, 291 P.2d at 704.
lo133 Colo. 379, 295 P.2d 1035 (1956).
z1133 Colo. 430, 297 P.2d 270 (1956).
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Mar.- pr., 195787was promoted by use of Quinn's investment (This arose o oa
promotional scheme to drill and develop a Rangely oil and gas
lease.)In Weick .V. Rickenbaugh Cadillac Co.,12 plaintiff's intestate
had been the salesmanager for defendant. At the time of decedent's
death, it is admitted that he was entitled to in excess of $6,000.00
for accumulated commissions due and payable at the date of
his death. The dispute concerns plaintiff's claim for an additionalamount of commissions on sales which were not consummated, by
delivery, until after decedent's death, but with respect to which
contracts of purchase or orders, had been signed prior to decedent's
death. The trial court held that plaintiff had not made out a prima
facie case which would justify a recovery of these additional com-
missions and entered judgment for only those commissions ad-
mitted to be due. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment and
remanded the cause for presentation of evidence on behalf of de-
fendant company. The reason being: (1) Unless there is an agree-ment clearly providing to the contrary, a person selling on a com-
mission basis is entitled to commission when a sale is made, ir-
respective of when shipment takes place, (2) The complaint of
plaintiff stated a claim against the company which was supportedby evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case.
"9 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 40 (1956).
W1WMUTUAL, INC.
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4. CONDITIONS To CONTRACTUAL DUTY OF IMMEDIATE PERFORMANCE
While some of these cases could be discussed under the heading
of offer and acceptance or consideration they are more significantly
handled here.
(a) Three cases involving real estate broker's commission:
(i) In McCullough v. Thompson,13 the plaintiff, broker, se-
cured a purchaser according to the terms of the listing and a con-
tract was signed by the principals (sellers) and purchasers. The
principals refused to close on the accepted terms. The broker, cor-
rectly, was held to have earned his commission and the refusal of
the principals to close on a contract they had approved could not




defeat the broker's claim. The Supreme Court found that the con-
ditions of the statute14 had been met.
(ii) In another case for broker's commission the Supreme
Court held that the conditions of the same statute had not been
met. This was Ginsberg v. Frankenberg." The plaintiff, a licensed
broker and attorney, drew a non-exclusive listing and was to have
as his commission any excess over a stated price if sale was to a
buyer procured by the broker and disclosed to the principal, and
the excess over the stated price, but not less than "regular commis-
sion as provided by the Denver Board of Realtors" if sale to such
disclosed person was by the owner. No provision was made if sale
was through another broker. Another broker sold the property for
a price in excess .of any offers ever secured by the plaintiff, lbut
less than the price stated in the plaintiff's listing. The court af-
firmed a judgment of dismissal, stating that the listing had to be
construed against the one who drew it. The real basis for this
holding is that the plaintiff never produced the necessary buyer,
and never became entitled to a commission under the above statute.
In other words, it is either a case of no acceptance or non-perform-
ance of a condition.
(iii) Heady v. Tomlinson,6 is a case wherein a broker ten-
dered an offer to an owner at the request of a person who had been
negotiating with the owner. This owner is the present defendant.
The sale was closed and the broker was present at the closing. The
owner refused to pay the commission claimed and appealed from
an adverse judgment. In reversing the judgment, the Supreme
Court stated that even though there was a listing agreement signed
by the owner, the broker was not himself, nor by his efforts, re-
sponsible for the sale. Consequently, the broker was not entitled
to a commission.
(b) Condition precedent of notice of suit in public liability
insurance contract.
Ewing v. Colorado Farm Mut. Cas. Co.," concerns an action
against an insurance company whose policy contained the follow-
ing usual condition: "no action shall lie against the Company, un-
14Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 117-2-1 (1953).
1 See note 4 supra.
"6299 P.2d 120 (Colo. 1956).
" 133 Colo. 447, 296 P.2d 1040 (1956).
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less as a condition precedent thereto, there shall have been full
compliance with all the terms of this policy."'18 One term of the
policy required the insured to give notice to the company in case
of suit against the insured. The trial court had dismissed the plain-
tiffs' action upon the plaintiffs' own evidence that (a) they were
judgment creditors of a person who was driving the insured ve-
hicle, on a mission of his own, not with direct or delegated author-
ity of the insured, and (b) no notice had been given to the insurer
of the prior action against the driver. In affirming the trial court's
judgment, the Supreme Court describes the plaintiffs as third-party
beneficiaries to the contract between the insured and the insurer,
who are required, as such beneficiaries, to prove performance of
conditions precedent, which they neither did nor alleged. As to the
statute, 9 the court stated "it is exquisitely calipered as an impon-
derable"20 but does not eliminate the condition of notice.
5. JOINT OBLIGATIONS
Womack v. Grandbush2' dealt with the right of a judgment
creditor of one partner to have a third person, a partner of the
judgment debtor, show cause under Rule 106 (a) (5)22 why such
other partner should not be bound by the original judgment. In
this case the original judgment was obtained on what appeared to
be an individual obligation, but facts disclosed in the trial of the
original action 23 indicate the obligation to have been a partnership
obligation. The order and judgment dismissing the petition was
reversed.
Note: Not all partnership obligations are joint and several. 24
See C.R.S. 76-1-1 (joint and several obligations) and compare C.R.S.
'53 104-1-15 (2). Colorado statutes provide that partners are liable
jointly, and not jointly and severally, 25 except when specified con-
ditions2 6 appear. The Rules of Civil Procedure do not change sub-
stantive law and Rule 106 (a) (5) should apply only where the
omitted party did not have to be made a party under the substan-
tive law or, if made a party, could not be served with process.
Otherwise Rule 106 (a) (5) would change the substantive stat-
utory law. Perhaps substantively there was an estoppel in Womack
v. Grandbush, but it is difficult to see since all relevent facts con-
cerning the other partner were developed during the original trial.
6. REMEDIES
(a) Rescission and restitution for fraud in the inducement.
Rescission was held to be the proper remedy in Dumas v.
Klatt,'2 7 although the court had to award a decree for payment of
money, instead of restoring the specific property which the de-
fendant, the delinquent party, had received from the plaintiffs. In
this case, the plaintiff bought a duplex from the defendant who
38 Id. at 452, 296 P.2d at 1043.
" Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann § 13-7-23 (1953).
= 133 Colo. 451, 296 P.2d at 1043.
21298 P.2d 735 (Colo. 1956).
Colo. R. Civ. Proc. 106 (a) (5).
'Cf. Grandbush v. Wornack, 129 Colo. 26, 266 (P.2d 771 (1954) (cited in instant case).
See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 76-1-1 (1953) (joint and several obligations).
ssColo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 104-1-15 (2) (1953).
Id. §§ 104-1-13 & 14.
132 Colo. 333, 288 P.2d 642 (1955).
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knowingly misrepresented material facts concerning the duplex
with the intent of inducing the purchase by plaintiff. Plaintiff did
reasonably rely on these misrepresentations, as was to have been
expected. Plaintiff tendered the duplex back to the defendant, but
to preserve it, and avoid increased damages, continued to rent it
pending outcome of the action. The court restored the status quo,
insofar as possible, by decreeing that the defendant pay the plain-
tiff the purchase price, plus expenses of operating the duplex, less
rentals received by the plaintiff.
Note: The Supreme Court spoke of fraud in the "inception"
without defining it as fraud in the procurement, in which event the
transaction would be void (but restitution would still be proper)
and fraud in the inducement, which it was, in which event the
agreement is merely voidable at the instance of the injured party.
When the agreement is voidable, the injured party may elect to
affirm and seek damages or may rescind and seek restitution. 8
(b) Damages for fraud in the inducement.
A judgment for damages (in the form of cancellation of pur-
chase money notes) in Cherrington v. Woods, 29 was reversed. Here,
the plaintiff purchased a tavern from the defendant, under a con-
tract which provided: "It is understood that the books and records
of said business will be open and available for Mr. Wood's inspec-
tion. . . ."0 A year after the purchase plaintiff claimed he was de-
2 5 Williston, Contracts 9 1488 (Rev. ed. 1937). Restatement, Contracts § 475, comments (a) &
(b) (1932). .S132 Colo. 500, 290 P.2d 226 (1955)
o Id. at 503, 290 P.2d at 227.
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frauded in that the business showed a net profit which was much
less than the $1,400.00 to $1,600.00 per month claimed to have been
represented by the seller. The Supreme Court reversed the judg-
ment, dismissed the complaint and ordered further proceedings on
the counterclaim on the notes given by plaintiff for the unpaid
balance of the purchase price. The reason given being:
"Where the means of knowledge are at hand and equally avail-
able to both parties, and the subject of purchase is alike open
to their inspection, if the purchaser does not avail himself of
these means and opportunities, he will not be heard to say
that he has been deceived by the vendor's representations.",'
(c) Rescission for breach of warranty in contract of sale.
Rudd v. Rogerson"2 is an action which construes Uniform Sales
Act,8 3 dealing with rescission as a remedy for breach of an express
warranty in a sale. In this instance, plaintiff sought to rescind the
purchase of cattle, which were expressly warranted, prior to the
sale, in the bill of sale, and even after delivery, to be registered, or
registerable, Aberdeen Angus cattle. The defendant argued that
the plaintiff, by inspection of the cattle and the herd book, which
was in plaintiff's hands for a week (but which defendant himself
represented as needing additional entries to constitute a complete
record) knew or could have discovered the incorrectness of the
warranty. Plaintiff showed that he did not rely on the herd book,
but on the representations of defendant. In reversing a judgment on
a counter claim for balance due on the purchase price, and rein-
stating the plaintiff's complaint, our Supreme Court held:
(1) The defendant sold the cattle under an express warranty
as defined in the above statute.
(2) Where an expressed warranty is given, the buyer is not
precluded from relying on it, unless his investigation reveals the
defect. The court said that the maxim, caveat emptor, has no ap-
plication to matters included in an express warranty.
Comment: The two cases are probably consistent because in
Cherrington the statements were mere representations and in Rudd
the Court found an express warranty.
7. DISCHARGE OF CONTRACTURAL DuTy BY:
(a) Performance
Erickson v. Publix Cab Co." Plaintiff's testatrix was injured
when defendant's taxi cab backed into testatrix in a public high-
way. Testatrix had been a fare-paying passenger in the taxi. The
taxi cab driver parked the cab at the testatrix's destination, as-
sisted testatrix to the sidewalk, received his fare and returned to the
cab. Testatrix started to cross the street behind the cab, and the
cab in backing up struck testatrix. Shortly after the accident, testa-
trix died. Plaintiff sues, not in tort, but on the implied contract for
safe carriage between a carrier and its passenger, alleging that test-
atrix was still a passenger at the time of the accident. The trial
31 Id. at 506, 290 P.2d at 228.
3' 133 Colo. 506, 297 P.2d 533 (1956).
mColo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 121-1-12 (1953).
" 301 P.2d 349 (Colo. 1956).
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court sustained a motion for a directed verdict in favor of the de-
fendants. The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the trial court,
for the reason that the contract between a carrier and passenger
terminates at such time as the carrier has discharged the passenger
in a safe place (which in this instance was the public sidewalk).
Thereafter, the testatrix was a member of the general public and
defendant owed her the same duty that it owed to all other per-
sons on the street or sidewalk. This duty was no part of the con-
tract for safe carriage.
Note: The reason for the unique theory of plaintiff is that if the
claim were based on negligence it would be an action to recover for
injuries done to the person, which does not survive under the
statute.3 5
(b) Release and mutual rescission.
In Johnston v.Emerson3 6 the plaintiff contracted with defend-
ant to remodel a certain structure. Disputes arose and the parties
entered into a release and rescission agreement under which de-
fendant warranted and guaranteed that all work already executed
under the agreement would be sound and waterproof, free from de-
fects of materials and workmanship for a period of one year from
August 18, 1949. In an action for damages filed in 1951, but tried
in 1955, experts testified as to defects in work done prior to the
date of the release and rescission, and not within the terms of the
guarantee. In holding that the judgment in favor of plaintiff should
be reversed and the complaint dismissed, the Supreme Court ruled:
85 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 153-1-9 (1953).
133 Colo. 343, 296 P.2d 229 (1956).
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(1) The rescission agreement relieved defendant of the obliga-
tions of the original contract;
(2) The release agreement was to be construed against its
makers, plaintiffs, and
(3) Duties, if any, of defendants were to be measured as of the
one year guarantee period, and not by conditions five years later.
(c) Surrender of Promissary Note to its makers:
Two of the defendants in Denver National Bank v. McLagan,
7
defended an action by the bank, special administrator, of the estate
of Margaret Hurley, deceased, on $7,000.00 in notes executed by de-
fendants, on the ground that the decedent had returned the notes
to the makers with the statement, "I want thee and John to have
these.38 As to another claim concerning a later loan of $2,000.00,
defendants contended this also to have been a gift. They had been
paying interest on it and when the $2,000.00 was delivered one de-
fendant indicated that John could use it at six per cent. The Su-
preme Court affirmed that part of the judgment which found that
the notes were the subject of a gift to the makers, but reversed
as to the $2,000.00 with instructions to enter judgment for this
amount. The reasons were:
(1) Voluntary surrender of a promissary note by the named
payee to the maker will operate in and of itself as a gift and ex-
tinguishment of the debt and in such case it is not necessary to the
validity of the gift that the note shown be endorsed by the payee.
(2) Lack of a note for the $2,000.00 does not evidence an intent
to make a gift, and payment of interest negatives donative intent.
(d) Substantial failure of consideration.
Scientific Packages, Inc. v. Gwinn.'9 On March 16, 1953, de-
fendant Gwinn gave Shapiro a written 10 day option to buy
Gwinn's interest in Scientific Products, Inc. (hereafter called Sci-
entific). Shapiro exercised the option by making certain payments
and promising to have Scientific, within 10 days, secure a release
from the First National Bank of Denver, releasing Gwinn from all
obligation as a guarantor of a third person's note. Gwinn agreed
that neither he nor any corporation "now" controlled by him would
compete with Scientific, directly or indirectly, for five years, in
= 133 Colo. 487, 298 P.2d 386 (1956).
's Id. at 492, 298 P.2d at 388.
S301 P.2d 719 (Colo. 1956).
9 COLORADO SUPREME
EXPERT COURT GOLDEN
9 U. S. SUPREME COURT
BRIEF • 10TH CIRCUIT COURT BELL
OF APPEALS
PRINTERS • INTERSTATE COMMERCE PRESS
COMMISSION
2400 Curtis Denver 5, Colorado AL 5-0481
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the United States. Time was expressly made of the essence. Sha-
piro, without justification, failed to secure the required release
from the bank, and Gwinn had to purchase the note for $10,000.00.
In September, 1953, a corporation called Die-Craft Corpora-
tion was organized. Gwinn became a stockholder in this corpora-
tion, and in April, 1954, it started to compete with Scientific.
Scientific, Shapiro and others, seek to enjoin Gwinn and Die-Craft
Corporation from competing. When the application for a temporary
injunction was denied by the trial court, a writ of error was
prosecuted to review the denial.
The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the injunction
stating:
(1) Failure to release Gwinn from liability on the note held
by the Bank in accordance with Shapiro's promise was a substan-
tial breach of the contract, which deprived plaintiffs of the right
to demand performance by Gwinn of the agreement not to operate
a competing business. The party who commits the first substantial
breach of a non-divisible contract is also deprived of the right to
complain of a subsequent breach by the other party.
(2) Neither corporation was party to the contract between
Gwinn and Shapiro. Gwinn could not compel Scientific to secure
the release, and Gwinn did not waive the duty of Shapiro to secure
the release.
(3) Die-Craft Corporation was not a corporation, "now" con-
trolled by Gwinn, within the meaning of the March 16, 1953, option
contract.Note: Scientific was a third party donee beneficiary; Gwinn's
duty not to compete was dependent on the release, and the donee's
rights were likewise dependent (conditional).
8. ILLEGAL BARGAINS
(a) Restraint of Trade
A restraint on competition was found to be enforcible and rea-
sonable in the case reported as Mabray v. Williams.4 0 The plaintiff
had hired the defendant as an associate physician under terms of a
written contract which restricted Dr. Mabray, upon termination of
association with plaintiff, from practicing medicine for five years,
in a radius of fifty miles of Lamar, Colorado, without written per-
mission of Dr. Williams. When the contract terminated, Dr. Mabray,
without such permission continued to practice in Lamar. Dr. Wil-
liams secured an injunction and the Supreme Court affirmed the
decree on the basis of Freudenthal v. Espey,' 1 a case which also
involved physicians, quoting: "The reasonable and fair protection
to which the plaintiff is entitled can only be obtained by the
parties conforming expressly and exactly to the terms of the
contract."
4 2
Query: Should not public policy, in view of the shortage of
doctors, have confined plaintiff to a claim for damages?
4o 132 Colo. 523, 291 P.2d 677 (1955).
'45 Colo. 488, 102 Pac. 280 (1909) (cited in instant case).
2 Id. at 506, 102 Pac. at 286.
SHCHS-LAWLOR -CORPORATIOU SEHLS- ELPIBE 5-3422
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(b) Severability and enforceability of legal portion of contract.
If the legal portion of a contract is severable from an illegal
portion, the courts will enforce the portion to which no illegality
attaches. In Carter v. Thompkins,43 the plaintiff contracted to fur-
nish and install plumbing fixtures, a furnace, stoker, ducts, etc.
The statute44 requires a license to install plumbing fixtures. No
such license is required as to the furnace, stoker, ducts, etc., nor
to sell plumbing fixtures. From a summary judgment dismissing
the complaint when it appeared that plaintiff lacked the statutory
license, plaintiff appealed and in reversing the summary judgment
and remanding for further action it was held:
(1) Contracts for services by one who is required by statute
to have a license to engage in the particular profession, trade or
calling, and who does not have such a license are generally unen-
forcable.
(2) This contract is severable and therefore enforceable as to
all amounts due, except for installing plumbing fixtures.
(3) If plumbing fixtures were installed by a licensed plumber,
on behalf of plaintiff, that plumber could, in his own name, sue for
installation services.
9. QUANTUM MERUIT RECOVERY FOR VALUE OF MATERIAL DELIVERED
AND LABOR PERFORMED
Leoffer v. Wilcox45 presents the unique situation of a suit by a
well driller's administratrix for the reasonable value of materials
and labor in drilling a well for defendants. During lifetime of the
driller the defendants had secured a substantial rebate of monies
paid the driller by representing that they were dissatisfied with the
well drilled, since it only produced 200 gallons per minute, instead
of the guaranteed 1000 gallons per minute. But while leading the
driller to believe the well was useless for irrigation, the defendants
were arranging to and did use it to irrigate 100 acres of land. In
affirming a judgment for the plaintiff, the Supreme Court reasoned:
(1) The refund and rescission agreement "was predicated upon
a mistake of fact if the testimony is considered in its most favor-
able light in behalf of defendants, or as a result of the fraudulent
representation taken at its worst .... 41
(2) As stated in Louthan v. Carson,47 "... where a thing is so
far perfected as to answer the intended purpose, and it is taken pos-
session of and turned to that purpose, by the party for whom it was
constructed, no mere imperfection or omission, which does not vir-
tually affect its usefulness, can be interposed to prevent a recovery,
subject to a deduction for damages, consequent upon the imperfec-
tion complained of."
48
(Note: On the court's reasoning, recovery cannot clearly be de-
termined as either contract or quantum meruit, and is here treated
as the latter.)
"133 Colo. 279, 294 P.2d 265 (1956).
"Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. J 107-1-9 (1953).
"132 Colo. 449, 289 P.2d 902 (1955).
"Id. at 452, 289 P.2d at 904.
'T63 Colo. 473, 168 Pac. 656 (1919) (cited in instant case).
'" Id. at 477, 168 Pac. at 658.
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